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STATE OF NEW YORK- BOARD OF PAROLE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 
Name: Lane, Rakeem Facility: Gowanda CF 
NY SID: 
DIN: 18-B-0960 
Appeal 
Control No.: 
08-030-18 B 
Appearances: Charles Greenberg Esq. 
3840 East Robinson Road 
#318 
Amherst, New York 14228 
Decision appealed: July 2018 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 15 months. 
Board Member(s) Coppola, Demosthenes, Drake 
who participate~: 
Papers considered: Appellant's Brief received February, 22, 2019 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMPAS instrument. --determine that the decision appealed is hereby: 
_Vacated, remanded for de novo. interview _Modified to ___ _ 
_Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to----
~d -. _Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
· Commissioner 
If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto. 
This ·Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separ e :Onctings of 
the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on ~ O/) .;( . 
I P 
bistribution: Appeais Unit - Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File 
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STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE 
APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION 
Name: Lane, Rakeem DIN: 18-B-0960  
Facility: Gowanda CF AC No.:  08-030-18 B 
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     Appellant challenges the July 2018 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing 
a 15-month hold. Appellant’s instant offense is for drunk driving.  Appellant raises the following 
claims: 1) the decision is arbitrary and capricious, and irrational bordering on impropriety, in that 
the Board failed to consider and/or properly weigh the required statutory factors. 2) the decision 
violated his constitutional liberty interest in release. 3) the decision lacks details. 4) no aggravating 
factors exist. 5) the Board releases inmate with far worse records. 6) the decision illegally 
resentenced him. 7) the decision was predetermined. 8) the interview was conducted in a hostile 
and biased manner. 9) the decision is based upon erroneous information in the COMPAS and the 
Parole Board Report (how many prior felonies, and not on parole/probation when committing the 
instant offense). 10)  the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law 
in that a fully completed TAP was not done, and, the statutes are now future focused. 
 
     Discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward for good conduct or 
efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability 
that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that 
his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness 
of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); 
accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 
(3d Dept. 2014).  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is 
relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s institutional record and 
criminal behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 
N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate 
decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 
718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000).  Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite 
factors is solely within the Board’s discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 
1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d 
at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 
415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).  The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give 
them equal weight.  Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 
2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 
(2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st 
Dept. 2007). 
 
     The fact that the Board afforded greater weight to the inmate’s criminal history, as opposed to 
other positive factors, does not render the denial of parole for that reason irrational or improper.  
Matter of Davis v. Evans, 105 A.D.3d 1305, 963 N.Y.S.2d 485 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of Lashway 
v. Evans, 110 A.D.3d 1417, 1418, 974 N.Y.S.2d 164, 165 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of McKee v. New 
York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204 (3d Dept. 1990).   
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     That inmate’s prior criminal record and nature of offenses for which incarcerated resulted in 
parole denial does not reflect irrationality bordering on impropriety.  Matter of Singh v. Evans, 
118 A.D.3d 1209, 987 N.Y.S.2d 271 (3d Dept.), lv. denied, 24 N.Y.3d 906, 995 N.Y.S.2d 715 
(2014). The Board is obligated to consider the inmate’s prior criminal record. Matter of Partee v 
Evans, 117 A.D.3d 1258, 984 N.Y.S.2d 894 (3d Dept. 2014); Applewhite v New York State Board 
of Parole, 167 A.D.3d 1380, 91 N.Y.S.3d 308 (3d Dept. 2018).  The Board may put more weight on 
the inmate’s criminal history. Bello v Board of Parole, 149 A.D.3d 1458, 53 N.Y.S.3d 715 (3d Dept. 
2017);  Hall v New York State Division of Parole,  66 A.D.3d 1322, 886 N.Y.S.2d 835 (3d Dept. 
2009); Davis v Evans, 105 A.D.3d 1305, 963 N.Y.S.2d 485 (3d Dept. 2013);  Jones v New York State 
Parole Board, 127 A.D.3d 1327, 6 N.Y.S.3d 774 (3d Dept. 2015); Wade v Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 
1487, 52 N.Y.S.3d 508 (3d Dept. 2017). The fact that the Board afforded greater weight to the  
inmate's criminal history, and not to an alleged positive institutional adjustment, does not render the 
denial of parole for that reason irrational or improper. Matter of Ortiz v. Hammock, 96 A.D.2d 735, 
465 N.Y.S.2d 341  (4th Dept 1983);  Peo. ex rel. Yates v. Walters, 111 A.D.2d 839, 490 N.Y.S.2d 573 
(2d Dept. 1985);   Matter of Ristau v. Hammock, 103 A.D.2d 944, 479 N.Y.S.2d 760 (3d Dept. 1984) 
lv. to appeal den. 63 N.Y.2d 608, 483 N.Y.S.2d 1023 (1984); Torres v New York State Division of 
Parole, 300 A.D.2d 128, 750 N.Y.S.2d 759 (1st Dept 2002);  Lashway v Evans, 110 A.D.3d 1420, 
973 N.Y.S.2d 496 (3d Dept. 2013). 
    The Board may cite an inmate’s prior history of irresponsible driving in its decision. Confoy v New 
York State Division of Parole, 173 A.D.2d 1014, 569 N.Y.S.2d 846, 847 (3d Dept 1991); Wade v 
Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1487, 52 N.Y.S.3d 508 (3d Dept. 2017).  
 Mclain v New York State Division of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 
N.Y.S.2d 629, 630  (2d Dept 1994). 
     The Board may consider an inmate’s need to complete rehabilitative programming in denying 
parole.  See Matter of Allen v. Stanford, 161 A.D.3d 1503, 1506, 78 N.Y.S.3d 445 (3d Dept.), lv. 
denied, 32 N.Y.3d 903 (2018); Matter of Barrett v. New York State Div. of Parole, 242 A.D.2d 763, 
661 N.Y.S.2d 857 (3d Dept. 1997); see also Matter of Connelly v. New York State Div. of Parole, 
286 A.D.2d 792, 729 N.Y.S.2d 808, 809 (3d Dept.), appeal dismissed 97 N.Y.2d 677, 738 
N.Y.S.2d 291 (2001). 
     There is no evidence the Board’s decision was predetermined based upon the instant offense.  
Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of 
Hakim-Zaki v. New York State Div. of Parole, 29 A.D.3d 1190, 814 N.Y.S.2d 414 (3d Dept. 2006); 
Matter of Guerin v. New York State Div. of Parole, 276 A.D.2d 899, 695 N.Y.S.2d 622 (3d Dept. 
2000).   
There is a presumption of honesty and integrity that attaches to Judges and administrative fact-
finders.  See People ex rel. Carlo v. Bednosky, 294 A.D.2d 382, 383, 741 N.Y.S.2d 703 (2d Dept. 
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2002); People ex. rel. Johnson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 180 A.D.2d 914, 916, 580 N.Y.S.2d 
957, 959 (3d Dept. 1992).  The Board is presumed to follow its statutory commands and internal 
policies in fulfilling its obligations.  See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 256, 120 S. Ct. 1362, 1371 
(2000).   
     There must be support in the record to prove an alleged bias and proof that the decision flowed 
from such bias.  Matter of Hernandez v. McSherry, 271 A.D.2d 777, 706 N.Y.S.2d 647 (3d Dept. 
2000), lv. denied, 95 N.Y.2d 769, 722 N.Y.S.2d 472 (2000); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. 
Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017) (rejecting bias claim); Matter of 
Grune v. Board of Parole,41 A.D.3d 1014, 838 N.Y.S.2d 694 (3d Dept. 2007). No such support 
exists in this case. 
     The Board’s decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was 
sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the denial of parole.  Matter of Applegate 
v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of 
Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); 
Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. 
Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).   
     Appellant’s assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is 
without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release 
per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein.  Executive 
Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 
745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 
281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001).  The Board was vested with discretion to 
determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration 
set by the Court.  Matter of Burress v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 
2007); Matter of Cody v. Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), lv. 
denied, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007).  The appellant has not in any manner been 
resentenced.  Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 
N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016). 
     An inmate has no Constitutional right to be conditionally released on parole before expiration 
of a valid sentence.  Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 
1, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979); Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 
(1980); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997).  The 
New York State parole scheme “holds out no more than a possibility of parole” and thus does not 
create a protected liberty interest implicating the due process clause.  Matter of Russo, 50 N.Y.2d 
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at 75-76, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 985; see also Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001); Matter 
of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005). 
    That the inmate has served his minimum sentence does not give him a protected liberty interest 
in parole release.  Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980); 
Matter of Warren v. New York State Div. of Parole, 307 A.D.2d 493, 493, 761 N.Y.S.2d 883, 883 
(3d Dept. 2003); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997). 
     Nothing in the due process clause requires the Parole Board to specify the particular evidence 
on which rests the discretionary determination an inmate is not ready for conditional release. 
Duemmel v Fischer, 368 Fed.Appx. 180, 182 (2d Cir. 2010). There is no due process requirement 
that the Parole Board disclose its release criteria.  Haymes v Regan, 525 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1975).    
The due process clause is not violated by the Board’s balancing of the statutory criteria, and which 
is not to be second guessed by the courts. Mathie v Dennison, 2007 WL 2351072 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); 
MacKenzie v Cunningham, 2014 WL 5089395 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
    Parole is not constitutionally based, but is a creature of statute which may be imposed subject to 
conditions imposed by the state legislature. Banks v Stanford, 159 A.D.3d 134, 71 N.Y.S.3d 515 
(2d Dept. 2018).   
    The Board may place greater weight on the nature of the crime without the existence of any 
aggravating factors.  Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 
N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). 
     As for other inmates, there is no entitlement to parole based upon comparison with the 
particulars of other applicants. Rather, each case is sui generis, and the Board may give each case 
a unique weighted value. Phillips v Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121 (1st Dept. 2007). 
    Denial of parole is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Parole Board relied on the factors 
defined by the New York statute. Hodge v Griffin, 2014 WL 2453333(S.D.N.Y. 2014) citing 
Romer v Travis, 2003 WL 21744079.  An arbitrary action is one without sound basis in reason 
and without regard to the facts. Rationality is what is reviewed under an arbitrary and capricious 
standard. Hamilton v New York State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 
(3d Dept. 2014). An action is arbitrary and capricious when it is taken without sound basis in 
reason or regard to the facts. Ward v City of Long Beach, 20 N.Y.3d 1042 (2013). Denial is 
neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Board relies on factors defined by New York statute.  
Siao-Paul v. Connolly, 564 F. Supp. 2d 232, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
   The appellant has failed to demonstrate that the Parole Board’s determination was affected by a 
showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety. Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 718 
N.Y.S.2d 704 (2001); Matter of Russo v New York State Board of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 77, 427 
N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980). 
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    In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory 
factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 
A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State 
Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. 
Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881. 
      Concerning alleged errors on the COMPAS and the Parole Board Report, none of these items 
appear in the final Board decision. Erroneous information, if not used in the decision as a basis for 
parole denial, will not lead to a reversal.  Matter of Khatib v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 118 
A.D.3d 1207, 988 N.Y.S.2d 286 (3d Dept. 2014); Matter of Restivo v. New York State Bd. of 
Parole, 70 A.D.3d 1096, 895 N.Y.S.2d 555 (3d Dept. 2010) [status report]; Matter of Grune v. Bd. 
of Parole, 41 A.D.3d 1014, 838 N.Y.S.2d 694 (3d Dept. 2007)[status report]; see also Matter of 
Gordon v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1502, 50 N.Y.S.3d 627 (3d Dept. 2017) [misstatement by 
commissioner in interview that inmate did not correct]; Matter of Perea v. Stanford, 149 A.D.3d 
1392, 53 N.Y.S.3d 231 (3d Dept. 2017) [erroneous information in PBR which inmate corrected 
during interview].    Nor did appellant raise these matters during the interview, thereby waiving 
them. .  Matter of Morrison v. Evans, 81 A.D.3d 1073, 916 N.Y.S.2d 655 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter 
of Vanier v. Travis, 274 A.D.2d 797, 711 N.Y.S.2d 920 (3d Dept. 2000); See Matter of Gordon v. 
Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1502, 50 N.Y.S.3d 627 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Rivera v. Stanford, 53 
N.Y.S.3d 404, 149 A.D.3d 1445 (3d Dept. 2017). 
     Appellant’s contention that the Board failed to comply with the 2011 Amendments to the 
Executive Law is likewise without merit.  Although Appellant alleges the amendments represented 
a fundamental change in the legal regime governing parole determinations requiring a focus on 
forward-looking factors, this proposition is not supported by the language of the statute itself, 
considering the relatively modest change to Section 259-c(4) and the absence of any substantive 
change to Section 259-i(2), which governs the discretionary release consideration process.  The 
Board still must conduct a case-by-case review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors, 
including the instant offense.  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A); Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 
A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014).  Thus, even where the First Department 
has “take[n] the unusual step of affirming the annulment of a decision of [the Board]”, it has 
nonetheless reiterated that “[t]he Board is not obligated to refer to each factor, or to give every 
factor equal weight” and rejected any requirement that the Board prioritize “factors which 
emphasize forward thinking and planning over the other statutory factors”.  Matter of Rossakis v. 
New York State Bd. of Parole, 146 A.D.3d 22, 29 (1st Dept. 2016).   
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     In making a parole release decision, the Board must consider the most current case plan that 
may have been prepared by DOCCS.  9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.2(b).  Correction Law 71-a specifically 
directs DOCCS, and not the Parole Board, to develop the Case Plan. Rivera v New York State 
Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295  (3d Dept. 2014). Due to appellant’s short 
time in prison before becoming immediately parole eligible, a TAP/Case Plan could not be prepared. 
 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
